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I. INTRODUCTION 
Jude Law fashions a smirk.1 Maintaining a cool demeanor, he says, 
“Mr. Smythe, . . . I’m from the Credit Union.” 
Smythe stammer[s]. “Wait, I can pay.” 
“Sorry,” [Jude says] “That’s not my department.” [Jude] raise[s] 
the taser and [takes] steady aim. “I’m legally bound to ask you if 
you’d like an ambulance on standby, though you will be unable 
to secure another artiforg2 from the Credit Union in replace-
ment.” 
“Wait,” [Smythe says] again, “don’t—” 
That’s as far as [Smythe] got before [Jude’s] taser darts slammed 
into [Smythe’s] chest and released their electricity. He went down 
twitching . . .3 
The ever-handsome Jude Law ties a white apron around himself.4 He reaches 
into his duffel bag and withdraws a scalpel.5 He pushes the sharp tip into 
Smythe’s belly.6 
Now, I am sure we can all use our imaginations to envision what happens 
next. If not, go see Repo Men.7 Nonetheless, I will let a spoiler slip. Jude Law 
proceeds to thrust his hand into Smythe’s open wound and dig out Smythe’s 
artificial liver.8 Why? Because Smythe defaulted on his “artiforg” payment.9 
When Repo Men was released in 2010, those of us who saw it probably thought 
this type of scenario could never happen; in fact, the absurdity of the plot is likely 
what attracted us to the theater in the first place. Although the idea of creating 
 
 1 See REPO MEN (Relativity Media 2010) (adapted from ERIC GARCIA, THE REPOSSESSION 
MAMBO (2009)). 
 2 Slang for “artificial organ.” 
 3 ERIC GARCIA, supra note 1, at 5. 
 4 See REPO MEN, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. Repo Men is a 2010 American science fiction action film—starring Jude Law, Forest 
Whitaker, and Liev Schreiber. See Plot Summary of Repo Men, IMDB, https://www. 
imdb.com/title/tt1053424/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (“Set in the near future when artificial 
organs can be bought on credit, [Repo Men] revolves around a man who struggles to make the 
payments on a heart he has purchased.”). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
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functioning artificial human organs is astonishing, it is frankly more frightening 
to think that a third party could legally retrieve one of our body parts without 
our consent. This fear is partly because artificial organs are not just outlandish 
ideas from a work of science fiction—they are scientific reality.10 These artificial 
organs are not made from huge chunks of metal, as in Repo Men, or from other 
synthetic or nonliving materials.11 3D bioprinted organs actually comprise of liv-
ing cells.12 
I present this scene from Repo Men because it generates several important 
questions. First, was Smythe’s organ really his? Well, it was his in the sense that 
the artificial organ was inside of him and functioned as a natural liver would (at 
least, we can hope it did). Yet, at the end of the day, we learn that Smythe did 
not have complete control and dominion over his liver because the “Credit Un-
ion” claimed superior title. The issue of title and ownership seems problematic 
in light of existing federal laws and regulatory schemes. Should 3D bioprinted 
organs be regulated as natural organs or as medical devices? What happens if 3D 
bioprinted organs are patentable? Is there ever a possibility that a recipient of a 
3D bioprinted organ could face a Repo Men fate? In light of the growing reality 
of 3D bioprinted organs, legal issues arising from these concerns can easily bleed 
into our society. This bleeding therefore demands exploration. 
The beginning of this Note dissects the scientific underpinnings of 3D bi-
oprinted organs. Part II explores statutory authority and controlling, or otherwise 
persuasive, case law that pertains to subject matter patentability. Current rights 
associated with medical devices and one’s own natural organs are also identified. 
Part III analyzes how 3D bioprinted organs should be regulated and how the 
patentability of 3D bioprinted organs squares with potential regulatory frame-
works. Ultimately, this Note reaches the conclusion that 3D bioprinted organs 
are patentable subject matter and that, in general, 3D bioprinted organs should 
be regulated as medical devices. In the patentability wrinkle, this Note also ob-
serves how the anti-commodification of patented 3D bioprinted organs would 
be a legal contradiction under current federal law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT ARE 3D BIOPRINTED ORGANS? 
3D bioprinting is a “manufacturing technique used to fabricate artificial im-
plants or complex tissue constructs through a layer-by-layer building process for 
 
 10 See sources cited and accompanying text infra note 29 (noting recent innovations in 3D 
bioprinted organs). 
 11 See Haitao Cui et al., 3D Bioprinting for Organ Regeneration, 6 ADVANCED HEALTHCARE 
MATERIALS 1, 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1002/adhm.201601118 (“3D bioprinting for organ 
[]generation involves . . . printing multiple living cells.”). 
 12 Id. 
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patient-specific therapy.”13 Unlike traditional 2D printing, 3D bioprinting is “a 
comprehensive process requiring various design considerations, including imag-
ing, modeling, printer choice, bioink selection, [cell] culture condition, and 3D 
construct development.”14 
There are two forms of 3D bioprinting that may be implemented to create a 
3D bioprinted organ: cellular bioprinting and acellular bioprinting.15 Cellular bi-
oprinting involves “directly deposit[ing] bioinks with viable cells to form a 3D 
living structure.”16 Conversely, acellular bioprinting uses nonliving materials such 
as “ceramics, metals, polymers and their composites” to form a 3D nonliving 
structure.17 This 3D nonliving structure is then integrated with cells, outside of 
the printing process, to form a 3D bioprinted organ.18 Acellular, compared to 
cellular, 3D bioprinting “provides more extensive choices for material selection 
and manufacturing method.”19 Nevertheless, both cellular and acellular printing 
techniques may be employed to create a 3D bioprinted organ.20 
B. THE PROMISE OF “ARTIFORGS” 
Repo Men got one thing right: artificial organs would herald an era where re-
cipients could extend or improve their quality of life.21 3D bioprinted organs can 
potentially revolutionize the medical world by “offer[ing] a pathway for scalable 
and reproducible mass production of engineered living organs” that “mimic their 
natural counterparts.”22 Given the high demand for donor organs, the United 
States’ organ transplant system is notorious for its lengthy waiting list and 
 
 13 Id. at 3. 
 14 Id. at 4. 
 15 See id. (explaining how 3D bioprinting can be “divided into [cellular and acellular tech-
niques]” to produce artificial organs). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 12 (citing C. Y. Yap et al., Review of Selective Laser Melting: Materials and Applications, 2 
APPLIED PHYSICS REVIEWS (2015), https://doi.org/10.1063/1.4935926). 
 18 See Chi-Chun Pan et al., Bioprinting for Tissue Engineering and Regenerative Medicine, MATERIAL 
MATTERS 49, 49 (2016), https://www.sigmaaldrich.com/content/dam/sigma-aldrich/docs/ 
Aldrich/Brochure/1/material-matters-v11-n2.pdf (“Acellular bioprinting is used to manufac-
ture the scaffold and biomaterial itself in the absence of cells during the printing process.”). 
 19 Cui, supra note 11, at 7. 
 20 Id. at 4. 
 21 See Xiaohong Wang, Bioartificial Organ Manufacturing Technologies, 28(1) CELL 
TRANSPLANTATION 5 (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6322143/ 
pdf/10.1177_0963689718809918.pdf (describing how 3D bioprinted organs “hold the prom-
ise to greatly improve the quality of health and average lifespan of human beings in the near 
future”). 
 22 Cui, supra note 11, at 15 (referencing Y. S. Zhang et al., 3D Bioprinting for Tissue and Organ 
Fabrication, 45 ANNALS OF BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 148-63 (2016), https://link.springer. 
com/article/10.1007%2Fs10439-016-1612-8. 
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sluggish waiting time.23 As of July 2019, over 113,000 men, women, and children 
were on the national transplant waiting list.24 This number grows each day, and 
in fact, another person is added to the waiting list every 10 minutes.25 To make 
matters worse, each day, 20 people die waiting for a transplant.26 These numbers 
illustrate how 3D bioprinted organs may help to relieve the organ supply short-
age by providing an additional supply source.27 
While organ bioprinting has “shown great promise in current research,” the 
challenge remains in formulating bioprinted organs that are suitable for implan-
tation.28 So, while we are not quite in a Repo Men-type world just yet, an implant-
able 3D bioprinted human organ future is in sight.29 Conceivably, in just a few 
years, “industrial, scalable, biofabrication of patient-specific functional 3D living 
human organs suitable for clinical implantation” will occupy the marketplace.30 
 
 23 Health Resources & Services Administration, Organ Donation Statistics, ORGANDONOR. 
GOV (July 22, 2019), https://www.organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Cui, supra note 11, at 2 (recognizing that 3D bioprinted organs “show great promise for 
. . . ultimately mitigating organ shortage and saving lives”). 
 28 Id. at 15. See also Tim Lewis, Could 3D Printing Solve the Organ Transplant Shortage?, 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/30/will-3d-
printing-solve-the-organ-transplant-shortage (explaining how the “one problem with creating 
whole organs that has to be overcome” is “creating capillaries, which can be smaller in diam-
eter than the smallest cell, has been nearly impossible”). 
 29 See Cui, supra note 11, at 26 (explaining how 3D bioprinted organs suitable for human 
implantation has “remarkable potential” of being fully realized); see also Vanessa Listek, Orga-
novo: Bioprinting Could Be the New Solution to Organ Transplantation, 3DPRINT.COM (May 6, 2019), 
https://3dprint.com/243160/organovo-bioprinting-could-be-the-new-solution-to-organ-
transplantation/ (stating how Organovo, a San Diego-based tissue engineering company, is 
set to test its 3D bioprinted liver “patches” in human trials in 2020); David Freeman, Israeli 
Scientists Create World’s First 3D-Printed Heart Using Human Cells, NBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/israeli-scientists-create-world-s-first-3d-printed-
heart-using-ncna996031 (noting how Israeli researchers, in April 2019, were the first in the 
world to 3D bioprint a heart made of human cells, albeit the size of a rabbit’s heart); Press 
Release, Rice University, Organ Bioprinting Gets a Breath of Fresh Air (May 2, 2019), 
https://news.rice.edu/2019/05/02/organ-bioprinting-gets-a-breath-of-fresh-air-2/ (an-
nouncing, in May 2019, how Rice University bioengineers were the first to ever develop bi-
oprinting technology that “addresses the challenge of multivascularization in a direct and com-
prehensive way” and 3D-printed a “lung-mimicking structure”); Jesse Damiani, BIOLIFE4D 
Just 3D Printed A Human ‘Mini-Heart’, FORBES (Sep. 9, 2019, 10:42am), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessedamiani/2019/09/09/biolife4d-just-3d-printed-a-hu-
man-mini-heart/#26c60efd7eee (announcing how BIOLIFE4D, a Chicago biotech company 
used 3D bioprinting to produce a miniature human heart that “features the same cellular struc-
ture as a full-sized human heart”). 
 30 Cui, supra note 11, at 15. 
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C. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
The intent behind limiting patentable subject matter is rooted in the underly-
ing sentiment that patents are tools for promoting progress.31 In exchange for 
disclosing useful, novel, and nonobvious inventions to the public, inventors’ 
“sweat of brow” is rewarded with patent protection of their invention.32 The 
legal reward of a patent arms owners with “the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States or importing the invention into the United States.”33 
 
1. Statutory Backbone 
Title 35 of the United States Code is the backbone of the United States’ pa-
tent framework.34 Novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness are necessary predi-
cates for patenting an invention.35 However, prior to pursuing the novelty, use-
fulness, and nonobviousness inquiries, one needs to ensure that the subject matter 
of her invention is patentable.36 Section 101 dictates what is patentable and what 
is not: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, sub-
ject to the conditions and requirements of this title.37 
 
 31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 32 See J. Phillips, Patents and Incentives to Invent, 8 ENDEAVOUR 90 (1984), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-9327(84)90044-9 (explaining how a patent give its owners cer-
tain legal rights, “contingent upon . . . public disclosure”). 
 33 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018); see also Phillips, supra note 32, at 90 (stating that patents confer “a 
legal right to prevent anyone else from making or using the invention which is its subject”). 
 34 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2018). 
 35 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (limiting grant of patents to inventions that are “new and useful”); see 
also § 102 (stipulating the novelty condition for patentability); § 103 (stipulating the “nonobvi-
ousness” condition for patentability). 
 36 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89, 101 (1981) (emphasizing how novelty and 
nonobviousness are “of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim 
falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter”); see also Mayo Collabo-
rative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90, 132 (2012) (“[T]o shift the 
patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to these later sections risks creating significantly greater legal 
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to 
do.”). 
 37 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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In essence, § 101 effectively identifies four categories of patentable subject mat-
ter: (1) processes; (2) machines; (3) products of manufacture; and (4) composi-
tions of matter.38 
In 2011, § 101 underwent a significant transformation. The Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (AIA), enacted under President Obama, transformed the 
patent system. Not only did the AIA replace the “first-to-invent” system with a 
“first-to-file” system, the AIA also took statutory note in § 101 that human or-
ganisms are not patent-eligible subject matter:39 “[N]o patent may issue on a claim 
directed to or encompassing a human organism.”40  Even though this § 101 
amendment (albeit, in the form of a note) undoubtedly provided clarification to 
the already broad language, Congress did not specify what exactly it meant by 
“human organism.”41 Uncertainty lingers, especially when considering some 
forms of biotechnology, like 3D bioprinted organs, teeter the fine line between 
patentable and unpatentable subject matter. 
 
2. Controlling and Relevant Case Law 
Despite § 101’s relatively broad wording, the Supreme Court has recognized 
non-statutory exceptions to subject matter eligibility.42 Natural laws, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas are all subject matter that cannot be patented.43  Be-
cause 3D bioprinted organs’ usefulness comes from their potential to substitute 
natural organs,44 3D bioprinted organs experience the most tension with the “law 




 38 Id. 
 39 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 40 Id. § 33(a), 125 Stat. at 340. 
 41 See id. (lacking an unambiguous definition of “human organism”); see also Ava Caffarini, 
Directed To or Encompassing a Human Organism: How Section 33 of the America Invents Act May 
Threaten the Future of Biotechnology, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 768, 778 (2013) (ex-
plaining how the lack of a clear definition for the term “human organism” in section 33 of 
AIA is practically problematic and ambiguous). 
 42 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (“This Court’s precedents provide three 
specific exceptions to § 101’s broad principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas.’”) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 43 See id. 
 44 Wang, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that bioprinted organs seek to be “exclusive organ 
substitutes for defective/failed human organs”). 
 45 See Jordana R. Goodman, Patenting Frankenstein’s Monster: Exploring the Patentability of Arti-
ficial Organ Systems and Methodologies, 15 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 65 (2017)(“If the 
object of creating an artificial organ is to replicate one already found in nature, then, as science 
gets closer and closer to the ultimate object, the products become less and less likely to be 
patentable subject matter.”) (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1351 (2012)). 
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a. Application of the “Law of Nature” Exception 
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Court considered 
the law of nature exception as it applied to patent claims. The Court noted that 
it had “‘long held that [Section 101] contains an important implicit exception[:] 
Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’”46 In 
applying the law of nature exception, the Court in Myriad held that a genetic 
sequence that was neither created nor altered was not patentable.47 While scien-
tists from Myriad found “an important and useful gene,” the Court explained 
that “separating [a] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of 
invention.”48 
The Court distinguished its decision in Myriad from its earlier decision in Di-
amond v. Chakrabarty, which held that scientists could patent a modified bacte-
rium.49 In Chakrabarty, the Court ruled on the patentability of a genetically-mod-
ified organism.50 Scientists added plasmids to a bacterium which enabled the 
bacterium to break down various components of crude oil.51 The Court justified 
the patentability of the bacterium on the basis that it was modified.52 The modi-
fied bacteria “plainly qualifie[d] as patentable subject matter” because the modi-
fied bacteria was “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of mat-
ter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] 
use.’”53 Unlike the modified bacteria in Chakrabarty, the genetic sequence Myriad 
researchers sought to patent “fell squarely within the law of nature exception.”54 
Myriad “did not create anything.”55 Rather, Myriad merely isolated the genetic 
sequence.56 But, the isolation of the genetic sequence did not change the fact that 
the sequence was what Myriad claimed and that such sequence existed in nature 
 
 46 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012)). 
 47 See generally id. 
 48 Id. at 591. 
 49 See id. at 590-91 (explaining why the Court’s holding in Chakrabarty is distinguishable from 
Myriad). Cf. id. at 591 (explaining how the Court’s reasoning in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoc-
ulant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), that a naturally-occurring nitrogen-fixing bacterium could not 
be patented because the patent holder did not alter the bacteria in any way, is applicable to the 
issue in Myriad). 
 50 See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 51 See id. at 305 (describing Chakrabarty’s invention as “a bacterium . . . containing . . . plas-
mids . . . capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil”). 
 52 See id. (noting that the modified bacterium’s oil degradation property was “possessed by 
no naturally occurring bacteria”); id. at 310 (“[P]atentee has produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature . . . . His discovery is not nature’s 
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.”). 
 53 Id. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
 54 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 591. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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before Myriad found it.57 Myriad neither “create[d] or alter[ed] the genetic struc-
ture of DNA.”58 Neither were Myriad’s claims “expressed in terms of chemical 
composition” or focused “in any way on . . . chemical changes that result[ed] 
from the isolation.”59 Moreover, the Court found that the genes Myriad isolated 
were not patentable subject matter.60 The Court further explained that these 
genes were not like cDNA, which the Court believed could be patentable.61 In 
contrast to regular DNA, cDNA is not naturally occurring.62 Thus, a “lab tech-
nician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.”63 Although 
cDNA “retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, . . . it is distinct from the 
DNA in which it comes from.”64 Therefore, cDNA is not subject to the “law of 
nature” exception and “is patent eligible under [Section] 101.”65 
Process claims, like product claims, are similarly restrained by the law of na-
ture exception.66 While both Chakrabarty and Myriad resolved whether a product 
was patentable subject matter, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. tackled whether a process that involved a law of nature was also patentable.67 
The Court held that Prometheus’ claimed processes68 were not patentable be-
cause “simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of general-
ity, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those 
laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”69  The Court, however, recognized that 
the mere recitation of a law of nature in a patent claim will not render the subject 
matter unpatentable.70 As long as the claimed process that invokes a law of na-
ture “has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is 
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself,” the 
claimed process containing the law of nature could be patentable subject 
 
 57 See id. at 590 (“It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic 
information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The location and order of the nucle-
otides existed in nature before Myriad found them.”). 
 58 Id. at 590. 
 59 Id. at 593. 
 60 See id. (holding that Myriad’s claims are “insufficient to satisfy the demands of § 101”). 
 61 See id. at 595 (stating that cDNA is patent-eligible subject matter). 
 62 See id. at 594 (“[C]reation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only 
molecule that is not naturally occurring.”). 
 63 Id. at 595. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See generally 566 U.S. 66 (2012)(applying “law of nature” exception in finding a process 
unpatentable). 
 67 See generally id.; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding a claimed bacterium patentable); Myriad, 
569 U.S. 576 (holding a genetic sequence unpatentable). 
 68 Prometheus’ patent claims “tell a treating doctor to measure metabolite levels and to 
consider the resulting measurements in light of the statistical relationships they describe.” 
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86. 
 69 Id. at 66. 
 70 Id. at 77-78. 
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matter.71 Thus, while the additional steps72 within Prometheus’s claims were not 
themselves natural laws, “neither [were] they sufficient to transform the nature 
of the claim.”73 
In light of biotechnological advancements not anticipated by Section 101 
drafters, courts have been tasked with contouring Section 101’s precise limita-
tions.74 This is best and most recently demonstrated by the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals’ resolution of whether a cloned organism is patentable subject matter 
in In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh).75 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that Dolly, the cloned sheep, was not patentable subject matter.76 Roslin con-
ceded that the donor sheep’s genetic material used to conceive Dolly could not 
be patented.77 However, Roslin argued that Dolly herself could be patented as 
she was “the product of human ingenuity” and “not nature’s handiwork, but 
[Roslin’s] own.”78 The court rationalized that “Dolly’s genetic identity to her do-
nor parent,” claimed to be identical to a natural sheep’s, “render[ed] her un-
patentable.”79 Given that animal clones do not possess “markedly different char-
acteristics from any [animals] found in nature,” clones are not patentable subject 
matter under § 101.80 Thus, Dolly the Sheep could not be patented.81 In response 
to critique that the court skimmed over the nuances of biology in reaching its 
 
 71 Id. at 77. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Even though a phenomenon of 
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle 
may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent 
unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that the claimed process was patentable subject matter because 
the additional steps “implement[] or appl[y] that formula in a structure or process which, when 
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to pro-
tect”).  Cf. Parker, 437 U.S. at 594 (“Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, not 
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algo-
rithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no 
patentable invention.”). 
 72 Additional steps of Prometheus claims included an “administering” step, a “determining” 
step, and a “wherein” step. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See generally, e.g., In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (de-
termining whether a sheep clone was patentable subject matter under § 101). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. Note, Roslin was already assigned a patent for the cloning process, which was not at 
issue. Id. at 1334. 
 77 See id. at 1337 (“Roslin does not dispute that the donor sheep whose genetic material was 
used to create Dolly could not be patented . . .”); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 593 (2013) (finding a naturally-existing gene unpatentable 
under § 101). 
 78 Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1337. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310). 
 81 Id. 
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decision,82 the court (in dicta) conveyed that where claims explicitly identified 
such “markedly different” biological nuances, a cloned organism may be patent-
able under § 101:83 
There is nothing in the claims, or even in the specification, that 
suggests that the clones are distinct in any relevant way from the 
donor animals of which they are copies. The clones are defined 
in terms of the identity of their nuclear DNA to that of the donor 
mammals. To be clear, having the same nuclear DNA as the do-
nor mammal may not necessarily result in patent ineligibility in 
every case. Here, however, the claims do not describe clones that 
have markedly different characteristics from the donor animals 
of which they are copies.84 
Given this emphasis on claim construction, it could be said that the court in 
Roslin did not turn a blind-eye to science.85 Arguably, Roslin affects claim con-
struction more so than the patentable science.86 
D. CURRENT REGULATION OF HUMAN ORGANS 
1. The Right to (Not) Sell Your Organs 
Section 274e of the Public Health Service Act, otherwise referred to as the 
National Organ Transplant Act or “NOTA,”87 makes it illegal for “any person 
to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valua-
ble consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects inter-
state commerce.”88 The prohibition on the sale or purchase of human organs 
does not apply to human organ paired donations.89 Congress’ intent behind 
NOTA was “[t]o provide for the establishment of the Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation and the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, to 
authorize financial assistance for organ procurement organizations, and for other 
 
 82 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Dolly the Cloned Sheep Not Patentable in the U.S., IPWATCHDOG (May 
8, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/05/08/dolly-the-cloned-sheep-not-patenta-
ble-in-the-u-s/id=49471/. 
 83 See Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1339 (emphasizing claim construction contributed to the court’s 
“unpatentable” holding). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. (reasoning that clever claim construction may be used to patent an organism with 
identical nuclear DNA). 
 86 See id. 
 87 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (“NOTA”), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339 
(codified as amended §§ 42 U.S.C. 273-74 (1984)). 
 88 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(a) (West 2019). 
 89 See id. (“The [prohibition] does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation”); 
see also § 274e(c)(4)(defining “human organ paired donation”). 
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purposes.”90 The prohibition itself was meant to ban the commodification of 
human organs.91 Congress’ desire to anti-commodify human organs was primar-
ily influenced by three factors: “the religious belief that one’s soul is inextricably 
tied to their body, the lack of an altruistic system raises concerns about the quality 
of the organ supply, and because the free-market sale of organs will entrench 
social inequality by benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the poor.”92 
Importantly, NOTA goes on to define a “human organ” as: 
the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, 
bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof 
and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including 
that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services by regulation.93 
It is interesting to note, however, that the definition of “human organ” did not 
originally explicitly encompass fetal organs. In 1988, Congress amended the def-
inition of “human organ” to include fetal organs (and organ tissue parts). Con-
gressional desire to broaden such definition arose from: 
the fear of incentivizing abortions; (2) a lack of consent (it is im-
moral to allow a mother to consent to abortion on behalf of the 
fetus and the fetus obviously is unable to give consent to be 
aborted); (3) the conflation of the fetus as both the donor and 
the donation; and (4) the commercialization of fetal tissue.94 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services further expands NOTA’s “hu-
man organ” definition via its regulatory power by including “any vascularized 
composite allograft.”95 A “vascularized composite allograft” is defined as a body 
part with the following characteristics: 
 
 90 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339. See 
also Robert Jacobson, 3-D Bioprinting: Not Allowed or NOTA Allowed?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1117, 1122 (2016) (explaining how a principle purpose behind NOTA was to promote “equi-
table access” and “effective use” of organs (citing to S.REP. NO. 98-382, at 15 (1984), reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981)). 
 91 See Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1122 (identifying the Senate’s view that “human body parts 
should not be viewed as commodities.”) (citing S.REP. NO. 98-382, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981). 
 92 Id. 
 93 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(c)(1) (West 2019). 
 94 Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1132. 
 95 42 C.F.R. § 121.13 (2019)(emphasis added). 
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(1) . . . vascularized and requires blood flow by surgical connec-
tion of blood vessels to function after transplantation; 
(2) Containing multiple tissue types; 
(3) Recovered from a human donor as an anatomical/structural 
unit; 
(4) Transplanted into a human recipient as an anatomical/struc-
tural unit; 
(5) Minimally manipulated (i.e., processing that does not alter the 
original relevant characteristics of the organ relating to the or-
gan’s utility for reconstruction, repair, or replacement); 
(6) For homologous use (the replacement or supplementation of 
a recipient’s organ with an organ that performs the same basic 
function or functions in the recipient as in the donor); 
(7) Not combined with another article such as a device; 
(8) Susceptible to ischemia and, therefore, only stored temporar-
ily and not cryopreserved; and 
(9) Susceptible to allograft rejection, generally requiring immu-
nosuppression that may increase infectious disease risk to the re-
cipient.96 
Noticeably, the nine-part definition of a “vascularized allograft composite” is 
conjunctive, rather than disjunctive.97 The conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, 
nature of the definition significantly affects NOTA’s prohibition on organ sales 
and purchases in practice.98 The Secretary’s inclusion of “vascularized allograft 
composite” indeed broadens NOTA’s prohibitory umbrella over the sale and 
purchase of human organs. But, the conjunctive, relative to the disjunctive, na-
ture of the definition broadens the definition to a lesser an extent. To qualify as 
 
 96 42 C.F.R. § 121.2 (2019). 
 97 The “and” in “not cryptopreserved; and . . . [s]uscpetible to,” 42 C.F.R. § 121.2., makes 
the definition of “vascularized allograft composite” conjunctive. See A Guide to Reading, Inter-
preting and Applying Statutes, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 1, 4 (2017), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-Reading-In-
terpreting-and-Applying-Statutes-1.pdf (“‘And’ typically signifies a conjunctive list, meaning 
each condition in the list must be satisfied, while ‘or’ typically signifies a disjunctive list, mean-
ing satisfying any one condition in the list is sufficient.”). 
 98 See A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes, supra note 97, at 4. 
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a “vascularized allograft composite,” all nine parts must be met, rather than just 
one of the nine.99 Thus, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
effectively expanded the regulatory reach of NOTA’s prohibition on organ 
sales/purchases by broadening the scope of what constitutes a “human organ” 
under the law.100 Congress’ expansion of the definition, however, is not as drastic 
in application as one may think.101 
E. CURRENT REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 
Most, if not all, ownership and possessory rights with respect to medical de-
vice implants are ascertained through contract law.102 As a result, property rights 
can vary widely between of medical device recipients based on the flexibility and 
fluidity of the contractual processes that are available to them.103 Recipients the-
oretically bear the right to freely negotiate contractual terms with the opposing 
party (most of the time, a hospital/physician)104  and consent before being bound 
to such terms.105 While knowledge of this variance is important, this Note will 
only focus on ownership rights inherent to medical device recipients, contract 
law principles aside. 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) regulates medical de-
vices to ensure their safety and effectiveness.106 This regulation extends from 
pre-market devices to implanted devices.107 FDCA recognizes that a recipient of 
 
 99 See 42 C.F.R. § 121.2. 
 100 See, e.g., Mariam Aslam et al., Challenges and Best Practices for Health Systems to Consider When 
Implementing Risk-Share Contracts for Medical Devices, MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL SOCIETY (May 8, 
2019), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.19.0665 (highlighting the widespread 
contractual practices amongst device distributors, hospitals, and device recipients). 
 101 At least not as significant as if a disjunctive “vascularized allograft composite” definition 
was adopted. See A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes, supra note 97. 
 102 See Aslam, supra note 100. 
 103 See Aditi Bagchi, Parallel Contract, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 145 (2013) (“In the classical 
account of contract, parties . . . negotiate their agreements. Those agreements impose a spec-
ified set of performance obligations on each party, and the obligations of each are carefully tai-
lored such that the bargain could not be improved to their mutual satisfaction.”). 
 104 While, in theory, recipients (technically “pre-recipients” as prior to actual receipt of the 
medical device) have the right to freely negotiate, this right is often diluted by the inherently 
unequal share of power in the patient-physician/hospital relationship and a possible discrep-
ancy in bargaining power. EC Hui, Doctors as Fiduciaries: A Legal Construct of the Patient-Physician 
Relationship, 11 HONG KONG MED. J. 527, 527 (2005)(“The acquisition of powers by one party 
implies an inequality of influence, knowledge, and bargaining ability in [a fiduciary relation-
ship], and this provides the fiduciary ‘a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion 
to the detriment of that other person. . .’” (quoting Hosp. Prods. Ltd v U.S. Surgical Corp. 
(1984) 156 CLR 42 (Austl.) ). 
 105 See Bagchi, supra note 103, at 140. 
 106 Medical Device Regulation Act (Medical Device Amendments of 1976), Pub. L. No. 94-
295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. ch. 9, subch. V (2018)). 
 107 Id. 
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a medical device has an important ownership interest that must be protected.108 
However, the FDCA acknowledges that the recipient’s right is not the only own-
ership interest in the medical device.109 The device vendor, the hospital/physi-
cian that implanted the device, and the patent owner (if there is one) also possess 
ownership interests in the medical device.110 
Under Medicare, an explanted medical device (i.e. an implanted device that is 
later removed) “must be pursued by the provider as for free replacement or re-
duced charges under warranty.”111 This provision captures the desire to hold 
vendors accountable for any faulty medical device implants that could jeopardize 
recipients’ personal health.112 Fairness dictates that the vendor should bear the 
cost of these defects, not the recipient.113 Tort law, namely product liability, re-
inforces this rationale.114 
 
1. ‘Til Death Do Us Part? 
Whether, in the event of death, medical implants are removed or left intact 
largely depends on how the body is disposed of at death.115 In the case of burial, 
the general consensus is that there is no compelling reason to remove implants.116 
If the body is cremated, however, electronic and battery-containing medical im-
plants, like pacemakers and ICDS, are “almost always” removed before 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id.; see also sources cited infra note 111. 
 111 Kayla Bryant, Hospital Compliance Programs Need to Integrate Explanted Device Policy, WOLTERS 
KLUWER (Jul. 14, 2017), 
http://health.wolterskluwerlb.com/2017/07/hospital-compliance-programs-need-to-inte-
grate-explanted-device-policy/; see also Brenda Mickow et al., Medical Device Replacements, 
MAYO CLINIC (2016), https://assets.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Confer-
ence_Handouts/Compliance_Institute/2018/W13_2.pdf (“All eligible explanted medical de-
vices must be pursued for warranty credit and no-charge replacement. If the discounted re-
placement device cost is lower than half of the cost of the device, it must be reported on the 
claim.” (citing 42 C.F.R. § 412.89 and § 419.45)). 
 112 See 21 U.S.C. ch. 9, subch. V; Richard Kaye, Federal Preemption of State Common-Law Products 
Liability Claims Pertaining to Medical Devices, Implants, and Other Health-Related Items, 74 A.L.R. Fed 
2d § 1, §§ 1-2 (2013). 
 113 Kaye, supra note 112, at §§ 1-2. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Frank Swain, What Happens to Prosthetics and Implants After You Die?, BBC (Mar. 10, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20140311-body-parts-that-live-after-death. 
 116 See id. (“Inert devices such as breast implants and  replacement hips tend not to be re-
moved after death, largely because there’s no compelling reason to do so, and they pose little 
threat to the environment.”). 
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cremation.117 Otherwise, the devices would inevitably explode during the 
creamation process.118 
“Once removed, implants are typically discarded – both the European Union 
and the [United States], among others, have rules that forbid the reuse of im-
planted medical devices.”119 The ban on reuse, however, does not equate to a ban 
on resale. A decedent recipient’s estate may elect to keep the recipient’s implant 
and even choose to sell it (or a form of it) in the marketplace.120 For example, a 
purchaser may be a collector of used devices or may be interested in scrapping 
the device’s parts for money.121 Nevertheless, this right to sell a patented implant, 
despite the ban on reuse, arises from the exhaustion doctrine.122 
 
2. The Exhaustion Doctrine 
The exhaustion doctrine, otherwise known as the first sale doctrine, is a “ju-
dicially created and judicially shaped doctrine” in patent law.123 “A key to the 
exhaustion concept in the most common circumstances is that the patent owner 
has sold a product without restriction. The sale seems to bring along a promise 
that the patentee will not interfere with the customer’s full enjoyment of that 
product.”124 
Absent contractual restrictions to control downstream use and re-sale of 
goods, “‘[w]hen a patentee chooses to sell an item, that product is no longer 
within the limits of the monopoly’ and ‘instead becomes the private, individual 
property of the purchaser, with the rights and benefits that come along with 
ownership.’”125 These doctrinal underpinnings establish the default rights pur-
chasers of medical implants possess.126 In this vein, purchasers of medical 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. (explaining that “because . . . batteries [and other electronics] can explode when 
heated” such devices are “often taken out of the body after death – and almost always before 
cremation”). 
 119 Id.; see also Draft Guidance from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, FDA, 
on Reprocessing and Reuse 
of Single-Use Devices (Feb. 8, 2000), https://www.fda.gov/media/71761/download (ex-
plaining that “if the device is an implant, . . . the [single-use device] is categorized as high risk” 
and the single-use implant cannot be reprocessed or reused). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See, e.g., Clark Boyd, Following Cremation, Recycling Surgical Implants, PRI, (Jan. 30, 2012),  
https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-01-30/following-cremation-recycling-surgical-implants 
((discussing a company that purchases old metal medical devices to smelt and sell). 
 122 LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES 
& MATERIALS 701 (5th ed. 2017) (“[U]nlike copyright law, the patent exhaustion doctrine is 
not codified in the statute.”) 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. (quoting Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 
1531 (2017)). 
 126 Id. 
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implants are able to use, sell, or import the implant as they wish, as long as such 
conduct does not transgress other legal constraints.127 Recall, however, that the 
existing ban on reusing medical implants also restricts the market for used (ex-
planted) medical devices.128 Additionally, hospital regulations or other health reg-
ulations, may preempt—or, in the least, limit—an individual’s ability to keep their 
explanted device.129 Nonetheless, a slim market does not mean that recipients 
(or their estate) cannot and will not resell the device.130 For example, a profit can 
be made by salvaging the metal from metal medical devices (like hip and knee 
implants) and selling that metal on the open market.131   
The exhaustion doctrine allows purchasers and subsequent owners of ex-
planted, patented medical devices to enjoy relatively unrestricted ownership 
rights over such devices once these devices are released to them.132 The exhaus-
tion doctrine, however, does not apply to the sale of human organs.133 Human 
organs cannot be patented, so patent law and the judicially-created exhaustion 
doctrine under patent law is not implicated. In addition, NOTA prohibits the 




 127 See id. at 702 (“[T]he sale [of a patented object] transfers the right to use, sell, or import 
because those are the rights that come along with ownership, and the buyer is free and clear 
of an infringement lawsuit because there is no exclusionary right left to enforce.”) (quoting 
Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017)); see generally Lexmark (overturning the Federal Circuit’s rejec-
tion of an exhaustion defense where the patentee had sold its products—toner cartridges for 
laser printers—with an explicit “single use, no resale” limitation). 
 128 See Alec Klein, Used Medical Devices Being Sold on Ebay, Washington Post (Dec. 22, 2005), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2005/12/22/used-medical-devices-be-
ing-sold-on-ebay/ded0a712-f4c4-4d81-ba0c-acdf37658303/(recognizing that a market, albeit 
marginal, exists for used medical implants). 
 129 See U-M Hospitals and Health Centers Policies and Procedures, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CENTERS (2003), http://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcms-aami/files/pro-
duction/public/FileDownloads/HTM/Idea_Exchange/EI_explants_UM.pdf(describing 
University of Michigan’s hospital and health center’s “explant policy” that explants are not to 
be returned to patients unless properly sterilized); see also ECRI Institute, Ask HRC: Retaining 
Explanted Medical Devices, HEALTHCARE RISK, QUALITY, & SAFETY GUIDANCE (2016), 
https://www.ecri.org/components/HRC/Pages/AskHRC122716.aspx (explaining how hos-
pitals have a responsibility to manage certain risk when releasing explanted devices to patients); 
Nancy Chobin, Advice on Explanted Devices, INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/sterile-processing/advice-explanted-implants 
(“While we would like to accommodate the patient’s request, we must always comply with the 
standards and manufacturer’s instructions.”). 
 130 See, e.g., Clark Boyd, supra note 121 (discussing a company that purchases old metal med-
ical devices to smelt and sell). 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 122, at 701. 
 134 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339 
(codified as amended §§ 42 U.S.C. 273-74 (1984)). 
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3. The Case of the Infringing Medical Implant 
Another dilemma worth noting that invokes several ownership interests is 
the situation in which a recipient’s implanted medical device may be subject to a 
patent infringement suit.135 An individual is liable for patent infringement if he 
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent.”136 If the manufacturer of a recipient’s medical 
implant is found liable for patent infringement, the manufacturer is most often 
required to pay damages to the plaintiff, the rightful patent owner.137 Under cur-
rent law, the individual is thankfully left alone and will not face Smythe’s fate in 
Repo Men.138 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY   
The general consensus amongst legal scholars and scientists alike is that bi-
oprinted organs are patentable subject matter, so long as the 3D bioprinted organ 
sought to be patented is properly claimed.139 As patent applicants have learned 
from Dolly, claim construction largely dictates whether bioprinted organs can be 
patented.140 Although these bioprinted organs are made from human cells, as 
long as an applicant can claim a “markedly different characteristic” in 3D bi-
oprinted organs, then there is no reason such bioprinted organ claim will not 
pass the USPTO’s patentability muster.141 However, as scientists grow closer to 
producing a 3D bioprinted organ that is functionally fungible with a natural hu-
man organ, patentability grows more difficult.142 This is because the closer 
 
 135 See generally, e.g., Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (patent infringement suit involving a component of a prosthetic hip implant). 
 136 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018). 
 137 See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 517, 536-
42 (noting the commonality of damages as the form of relief in medical implant patent in-
fringement cases). 
 138 See id. 
 139 See generally Tabrez Ebrahim, 3D Bioprinting Patentable Subject Matter Boundaries, 41 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1 (2017)(exploring how bioprinted organs, as long as properly claimed, can be pa-
tentable subject matter); Judith L. Toffenetti & Atabak R. Royaee, Patentability of 3D-Printed 
Organs, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.genengnews.com/insights/patentability-of-3d-printed-organs/77900129/ (ad-
vocating that bioprinted organs are patentable subject matter). 
 140 See In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (indicating 
that a genetically equivalent or similar entity may be found patentable under § 101 depending 
on claim construction). 
 141 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding a bacterium’s “mark-
edly different characteristics” rendered it patentable subject matter). 
 142 See Jordana R. Goodman, Patenting Frankenstein’s Monster: Exploring the Patentability of Arti-
ficial Organ Systems and Methodologies, 15 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 63 (2017) (“The 
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scientists get, the closer scientists are to effectively replicating nature.143 With this 
goal, scientists seeking to patent such bioprinted organs tip-toe § 101’s implicit 
law of nature exception.144 
In spite of bioprinted organs “tip-toeing” the law of nature exception, recent 
innovations demonstrate that 3D bioprinted organs nonetheless possess mark-
edly different characteristics from natural organs that would render them patent-
worthy.145 While a bioprinted organ may consist of human cells, which them-
selves are naturally occurring, this does not mandate the finding that a bioprinted 
organ is naturally occurring and, therefore, not patentable under § 101. Not only 
is a bioprinted organ significantly distinct from a natural organ, but it is also a 
product of human ingenuity. These two showings demonstrate that, under the 
Chakrabarty/Myriad framework, a 3D bioprinted organ is patentable subject mat-
ter. 
A 3D bioprinted organ suitable for human implantation will ideally be func-
tionally equivalent to a natural organ.146 However, functional equivalence does 
not preclude patent subject matter eligibility as long as the 3D bioprinted organ 
possesses a markedly different characteristic from its natural counterpart.147 
Structurally, a 3D bioprinted organ may be markedly different from its natural 
counterpart.148 Whereas a clone, like Dolly the Sheep, is necessarily genetically 
identical to its natural parent, a 3D bioprinted organ is not necessarily genetically 
identical to its natural analogue. Specifically, 3D bioprinted organs are typically 
built by scaffolding live stem cells on other biomaterials, like polymers, that are 
not present in a natural human organ heart.149 Moreover, Roslin cannot be used 
to intuit that 3D bioprinted organs are unpatentable subject matter. A 3D bi-
oprinted organ is distinguishable from a cloned organism. 
In terms of human ingenuity, “stem cells cannot self-assemble into a uniform 
structure in vitro, let alone function as an organ.”150 The creation of a 3D 
 
closer scientists get to replication of a natural product, the further scientists get to patent pro-
tection of their invention.”). 
 143 See id. (“The problem lies in this progression: scientists are working to replicate a natural 
product.”); see also background discussion supra Part II.B (explaining the origins of and practical 
effect of the law of nature exception). 
 144 See sources cited supra note 143. 
 145 See sources cited supra note 29. 
 146 See generally Wang, supra note 21. 
 147 See Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1339 (holding that genetic similarity does not necessarily preclude 
patentability under § 101). 
 148 Id. 
 149 See Wang, supra note 21, at 5 (describing how bioprinted organs built with human cells 
typically also consist of inanimate polymers, or other biological polymers, not inherent to a 
natural human organ). 
 150 Judith L. Toffenetti & Atabak R. Royaee, Patentability of 3D-Printed Organs, GENETIC 
ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (GEN)(May 15, 2014), https://www.geneng-
news.com/insights/patentability-of-3d-printed-organs/. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding a genetically-modified bacterium patentable because it was a 
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bioprinted organ requires human manipulation.151 Natural forces, in isolation, 
are incapable of generating a 3D bioprinted organ.152 A 3D bioprinted organ 
does not form in a mother’s womb upon conception.153 A 3D bioprinted organ 
is created by a scientist after numerous hours spent in the lab tinkering with cells, 
bio-solutions, and a 3D printer to create something unnatural.154 Thus, a 3D 
bioprinted organ is a product of human ingenuity.155 
Even if the organ itself cannot be patented as a product of manufacture, the 
process of synthesizing the organ–as long as drafted with proper specificity—
may be eligible for a method patent.156 In fact, this has already been done for a 
3D bioprinted tissue.157 There is no reason–holding all other variables constant-
that a method for a bioprinted organ, which is a collection of tissues,158 cannot be 
patented. 
B. REGULATION OF PATENTED 3D BIOPRINTED ORGANS AS MEDICAL 
DEVICES 
Assuming the patentability of 3D bioprinted organs, a patented 3D bi-
oprinted organ would not qualify as a “human organism” because it is not subject 
to § 101’s law of nature exception.159 Moreover, a patented 3D bioprinted organ 
presents a sticky situation in terms of ownership rights. Human organs cannot 
be sold or purchased under NOTA.160 Since a patented 3D bioprinted organ is 
 
“product of human ingenuity” and possessed “markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature”); Cf. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 590 (holding that the BRCA gene was not patentable 
subject matter because the genetic sequence was naturally occurring and Myriad neither “cre-
ate[d] or alter[ed] the genetic structure of DNA”). 
 151 See Wang, supra note 21, at 5 (describing the creation of 3D bioprinted organs as a “man-
ufacturing process” by scientists). 
 152 In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 153 See id. (emphasizing that 3D bioprinted organs are artificial and intended to serve as sub-
stitutes to natural organs). 
 154 See Wang supra note 21. 
 155 See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding an altered bacterium to be patentable on 
the basis of human ingenuity). 
 156 See U.S. Patent No. 10390946 (granted Aug. 27, 2019) (claiming “[a] method of preparing 
biological tissue for use as a component of . . . a heart valve prosthesis” that contains biological 
tissue). 
 157 See U.S. Patent No. 20190093070 (granted Mar. 28, 2019) (claiming “[a] method of pro-
ducing a three-dimensional tissue having a vascular system structure” where “the cell used for 
forming the three-dimensional tissue” includes-but is not limited to-”one derived from . . . a 
human”).  
 158 Organ, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/organ(last visited Nov. 19, 2019, 9:17 PM). 
 159 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (case law explaining that for subject matter to 
be patentable the law of nature exception cannot apply). 
 160 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339 
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1984)). 
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neither a human organism nor a naturally-occurring composition of matter, a 
patented bioprinted organ is also not a natural human organ. In this vein, a pa-
tented 3D bioprinted organ would not be subject to NOTA’s purchase/sell pro-
hibition as it is not a “human organ.” To say otherwise would be a legal contra-
diction and retroactively negate a finding of patentability. Additionally, the 
legislative intent behind NOTA makes the argument for creating a specialized 
“bioprinted organ” exception a tough argument to swallow. 
A 3D bioprinted organ, patented or not, is more analogous to a medical de-
vice rather than a natural human organ for regulatory sake.161 Thus, a 3D bi-
oprinted organ should be regulated by the FDA as a medical device, specifically 
a Class III device.162 Treating a 3D bioprinted organ as such, NOTA rightfully 
would not apply as NOTA stands now. Nor should Congress amend NOTA to 
extend the ban of the sale and purchase of organs to patented 3D bioprinted 
organs. Doing so would contradict the legislative intent behind NOTA, which, 
if you recall, was inspired by three considerations: 
(1) the religious belief that one’s soul is inextricably tied to their 
body; 
(2) the lack of an altruistic system raises concerns about the 
quality of the organ supply; and 
(3) because the free-market sale of organs will entrench social 
inequality by benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the 
poor.163 
1. Can You Print a Soul? 
Beginning with the first factor, the religious belief that one’s soul is inextrica-
bly tied to their body is not applicable to a 3D bioprinted organ. A 3D bioprinted 
organ is synthesized by a 3D printer controlled by a scientist.164 A 3D bioprinted 
organ’s origin is a 3D printer—not a human body.165 An individual is not born 
 
 161 See Michael H. Park, For A New Heart, Just Click Print: The Effect on Medical and Products 
Liability from 3-D Printed Organs, U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 187, 199 (2015) (“[I]t is likely that 
with the combination of the FDA’s oversight of biological tissues for transplantation, medi-
cal devices for transplantation, and the similarity between artificial hearts and 3-D printed or-
gans that the FDA will have the duty to regulate the manufacture of 3-D printed organs.”). 
 162 See id. at 208. (“Since the artificial heart is already regulated as a Class III device, it would 
seem 3-D printed organs, hearts, livers, kidneys, etc., would be regulated as Class III devices 
[by the FDA].” (citing Product Classification, FDA  www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/ 
cfdocs/cfpcd/classification.cfm?ID=1021 (last updated Mar. 17, 2020) (classifying artificial 
heart))). 
 163 Jacobson, supra note 90 at 1122-23; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 164 See generally Wang, supra note 21. 
 165 Id. 
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with a 3D bioprinted organ.166  Therefore, one’s soul cannot be inextricably167 
tied to a 3D bioprinted organ because the individual (and his soul) lived for a 
discrete period of time without a 3D bioprinted organ. As such, Congress’ first 
consideration does not extend to 3D bioprinted organs. 
 
2. There Cannot Be Altruism Without “You” 
Congress’ second consideration, that the lack of an altruistic system raises 
concerns about the quality of the organ supply, also does not extend to 3D bi-
oprinted organs. This “altruistic” concern, in the natural human organ context, 
was buttressed by the belief that commodification would essentially destroy the 
voluntary organ donation system.168 Namely, this belief sprung from the notion 
that “[c]ompensation to donors [would] degrade the quality of the organ supply, 
by inducing potential donors to lie about their medical histories in order to make 
their organs marketable.”169  Altruism can be “defined as acting with the absence 
of any personal benefit beyond the satisfaction of giving.”170 In the organ dona-
tion context, altruism is typically defined as “an absence of monetary exchange 
and commercialization.”171 Altruistic concerns are implicated by an individual’s 
autonomy over their own organs — a function of bodily autonomy. Altruistic 
concerns are therefore relevant in the discussion of legalization of the sale/pur-
chase of natural human organs. However, such concerns are irrelevant to deter-
mining whether 3D bioprinted organs should be commodified. 
The primary purpose behind the FDA’s medical device regulatory system is 
to ensure the overall quality of medical devices by certifying such devices’ safety 
and functionality.172 The quality of the supply of 3D bioprinted organs can there-
fore be ensured by regulating these organs as medical devices. There is not a lack 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 Merriam-Webster defines “inextricable” as “incapable of being disentangled or untied.” 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inextri-
cable (last visited Apr. 4, 2020, 8:01 PM). 
 168 See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 860 n. 30 (9th Cir. 2012)( citing National Organ Trans-
plant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“If [people are allowed to sell 
their kidneys], I believe our efforts to promote voluntary organ donations would collapse, and 
health risks to transplant patients would greatly increase. . . .”). 
 169 Id.; see also id. n. 30 (citing to Maurice McGregor, Pragmatic Altruism, 160 CAN. MED. ASS’N 
J. 5, 91 (1999) (“The need for money is a disincentive to honest disclosure, a disincentive 
whose force will increase with the strength of the need.”). 
 170 Akshara Meran, Organ Donation: Altruism vs. Incentive, AMA J. ETHICS (VIRTUAL MENTOR) 
(2002), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/organ-donation-altruism-vs-incentive/ 
2002-08. 
 171 Marie-Chantal Fortin et al., The Enigmatic Nature of Altruism in Organ Transplantation: A 
Cross-Cultural Study of Transplant Physicians’ Views on Altruism, 3 BMC RES. NOTES 1, 1 (2010), 
https://bmcresnotes.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1756-0500-3-216. 
 172 See Medical Device Overview, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/industry/regulated-prod-
ucts/medical-device-overview (last updated Sep. 14, 2018) (stating that the FDA is responsible 
for “evaluat[ing] the safety and effectiveness of . . . medical devices”). 
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of a system that guarantees quality. Granted, some regulations specifically tai-
lored to 3D bioprinted organs may need to be added; however, the building 
blocks already exist.173 The FDA already oversees biological tissues174 for trans-
plantation and 3D printed medical devices175 for transplantation.176 A 3D bi-
oprinted organ, a 3D printed medical device for transplantation comprised of 
human cells,177 is merely a hybrid of two entities the FDA already regulates. 
Moreover, the second consideration is inapplicable to 3D bioprinted organs as 
systems (or at least the building blocks of a system) assuring the supply quality 
of bioprinted organs currently exist under the FDA. 
 
3. Social Inequality 
As for Congress’s third consideration in banning the purchase and sale of 
human organs, that the free-market sale of organs will entrench social inequality 
by benefitting the wealthy at the expense of the poor, key differences between 
3D bioprinted organs and natural human organs render this consideration irrel-
evant. As such, a free-market sale of 3D bioprinted organs, unlike natural human 
organs, will resemble the free-market sale of medical devices. The free-market 
sale of bioprinted organs will cause no more inequality as medical devices sold 
on the market cause now.178 This proposition draws from the similarities be-
tween medical devices already subject to regulation by the FDA, and the differ-
ences between 3D bioprinted organs and natural human organs. Like medical 
devices and unlike human organs, bioprinted organs are man-made.179 Thus, the 
pressures of scarcity inherent to natural human organs are not inherent to 3D 
bioprinted organs or medical devices, like pacemakers.180 Absent such scarcity of 
3D bioprinted organs, bioprinted organs as free-market goods will most likely 
 
 173 See Park, supra note 161, at 199 (“The FDA’s regulations cover human cells and tissues 
that are intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a [patient] . . . .’” 
(citing Tissue & Tissue Products, FDA, http:// www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Tis-
sueTissueProducts/default.htm (last updated Jul. 11, 2019))). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See Medical Applications of 3D Printing, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/3d-
printing-medical-devices/medical-applications-3d-printing (last updated Dec. 4, 2017) (“The 
FDA regulates 3D printed medical devices through the same pathways as traditional medical 
devices[.]”). 
 176 See Park, supra note 161, at 198 (“The FDA already regulates medical implants.” (citing 
Implants and Prosthetics, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalPro-
cedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/default.htm (last updated Sep. 30, 2019))). 
 177 See supra Part II.A (defining what a 3D bioprinted organ is). 
 178 Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1127 (“[3D bioprinted organ] expenses will probably be un-
affordable to the poorer segments of society, in effect, establishing a two-tier organ replace-
ment system: those with money can purchase a bioprinted replacement organ, while those 
without must wait on the lengthy organ donation list.”). 
 179 See id. 
 180 See id. 
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not, as Congress envisioned and feared, drive a wedge between social classes in 
a way free-market natural human organs would. 
An underlying catalyst behind this envisioned inequality is the anticipation 
that the majority of organ “sellers” would be low-income individuals.181 Such a 
catalyst, however, is absent in a realm where 3D bioprinted organs exist. While 
inequality could arise with respect to wealthier individuals being able to better 
afford 3D bioprinted organs by similar logic, it would not similarly extend to 
incentivizing low-income individuals to physically deprive themselves of a body 
part—a situation that Congress imagined in a world where the sale and purchase 
of natural human organs was legalized. The concern of physical deprivation is 
not present in the transaction of a 3D bioprinted organ. One cannot be deprived 
of something he never owned or possessed.182 The narrower scope of inequality 
associated with 3D bioprinted organs, relative to natural human organs, is largely 
due to a difference in these organs’ origin. When talking about the sale of natural 
human organs, the theory is that low-income individuals would generally be di-
rectly subjected to inequality in two ways. As touched on earlier, the first mech-
anism captures donor-related inequality.183 In a free-market of human organs, 
poorer people will face a greater incentive to donate their organs and will likely 
do so.184 This decision, pressured by financial trouble, bears the risk of not being 
a well-informed one.185 Moreover, the inequality surrounding the commodifica-
tion of 3D bioprinted organs is more akin to, if not coterminous with, that of 
medical devices. Thus, 3D bioprinted organs should be regulated as medical de-
vices. 
C. THE FATE OF AN INFRINGING BIOPRINTED ORGAN 
An individual who has a bioprinted organ subject to a successful patent in-
fringement case will likely not be subject to a Smythe-like “seizure and extrac-
tion” for several reasons. First, seizure would certainly be contrary to longstand-
ing public policy as the implant, albeit infringing, is nonetheless vital to that 
individual’s health and wellbeing.186 Additionally, as bioprinted organs should 
and will most likely be regulated as medical devices,187 seizure of the infringing 
 
 181 See id. 
 182 See Deprivation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An act of taking away.”). In 
the event, however, that one gains a property right in a 3D bioprinted organ – if treated as a 
medical device regulation-wise – these rights would be established by contract (with the hos-
pital/manufacturer) and hospital regulations. See discussion supra Part II.D; See U-M Hospitals 
and Health Centers Policies and Procedures, supra note 129 (example of internal hospital regulations 
for implants/explants). 
 183 See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 184 See Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1127. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See, e.g., discussion about how pervading values of autonomy and bodily respect have 
influenced federal legislation supra Section II.D.1. 
 187 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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organ as the sole remedy for a patent infringement case would be counter to 
longstanding judicial practice.188 Seizure would not serve a remedial purpose and 
would unduly burden the individual with the implant, rather than burden the 
primary infringer (the seller or manufacturer of the device). Judicial remedies, 
either compensatory or equitable, aim to make injured plaintiffs “whole again” 
or incentivize conformity with current law and disincentivize future aberrant be-
havior.189 Seizing an individual’s implant neither makes the patent owner “whole 
again” nor disincentivizes future infringement because the threat of seizure 
would be on the implant recipient, not the primary infringer. Thus, a remedy of 
“seizure and extraction” would be practically meaningless; it would merely be a 
remedy solely by name, not by function. Second, the seizure of infringing bi-
oprinted organs would most likely be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment as an unreasonable search and seizure, and under the Fifth Amendment as 
a prohibited taking of private property.190 Moreover given the myriad of policy 
and constitutional concerns, it is unlikely that individuals with infringing medical 
implants will end up like Smythe (at least not lawfully).191 
IV. CONCLUSION 
3D bioprinted organs will, more likely than not, be patent-eligible subject 
matter. It follows that a bioprinted organ, patented or not, should be regulated 
by the FDA as a medical device and should not be subject to NOTA’s commod-
ification ban on human organs. As NOTA stands now, 3D bioprinted organs do 
not fall within NOTA’s regulatory framework. Neither should NOTA be 
amended to expressly cover 3D bioprinted organs as to preserve initial legislative 
intent. 
With particular respect to patented 3D bioprinted organs, regulation of a pa-
tented 3D bioprinted organ as a “human organ” under NOTA would contradict 
a finding that a 3D bioprinted organ is patentable subject matter. Subjecting bi-
oprinted organs to NOTA’s anti-commodification provision would directly con-
flict with the patented organ’s circumvention of § 101’s law of nature exception. 
Thus, for the sake of remaining faithful to § 101’s text and underlying intent, 
patented bioprinted organs should not be regulated as human organs.   
As a final thought, the growing reality of bioprinted organs reflects the im-
mense rate at which technology is growing and the astounding breadth of 
 
 188 See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rewarding $26,348,984 in lost profit damages to 
patentee’s hip implant prosthesis). 
 189 See Ted Sichelman, supra note 137 (explaining traditional remedies rewarded in patent 
infringement suits). 
 190 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V. 
 191 As an additional consideration, family members who elect to sell a decedent’s infringing 
implant would be protected from liability by the exhaustion doctrine. See discussion of the 
exhaustion doctrine supra Section II.E.2. 
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scientific innovation. We, the public, need to begin considering the brink on 
which we stand and ponder what possibly lies on the other side. A Repo Men-like 
world is grim, but knowledge serves as a vital component to preventing such an 
outcome. For the time being, it is unlikely that any of us will end up like Smythe. 
Remember though, “artiforgs” seemed like a distant reality in 2010 and now they 
are undergoing medical trials for implantation. Smythe’s fate may similarly creep 
up on us if we turn a blind eye. 
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